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I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition and use of the death penalty have become disturb-
ingly attractive to America today. In an understandable effort to deal
with incomprehensible violence and senseless homicides, Americans
have accepted almost enthusiastically an abominable means to achieve
an end. Nearly seventy percent of the population support the death
penalty.' As of August 1, 1985, 1540 inmates were awaiting execution
1. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1982
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 262-63 (1983).
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on death row.2 The number of inmates actually executed has risen
drastically in the last few years. Two persons were put to death in
1982, five in 1983, twenty-one in 1984, and as of July 9, 1985, fifteen
persons had been executed.
3
The death penalty is the ultimate punishment handed down by our
criminal justice system. The final result of the death penalty is unal-
terable. Because the death penalty is unique, "different in kind" from
all other punishment,4 the federal and state judiciaries have, over
time, constructed various procedural safeguards that apply only to de-
fendants in capital cases.5
Some would suggest, however, that these procedural safeguards
are not adequate to overcome a major disadvantage that faces a de-
fendant in a capital case.6 During the jury selection process, before
the trial even begins, prosecutors are allowed to "death-qualify" mem-
bers of the venire from which jurors are chosen. "Death-qualifica-
tion" generally refers to a process used by prosecutors in capital cases
to exclude venire members who are opposed to capital punishment.
The standard applied to decide which venire members will be stricken
for cause due to their views on capital punishment is the subject of
this Article.
The landmark case of Witherspoon v. 1llinois,7 established the
standard that modern day courts have used to scrutinize the death-
qualification procedure. Death-qualification existed prior to Wither-
spoon and "was originally a by-product of the mandatory system of
capital punishment formerly in effect in the United States."s Wither-
spoon was the first time the United States Supreme Court squarely
addressed the issue of the effect of "death-qualified" juries on the con-
stitutional rights of capital defendants. It is important to note that
Witherspoon decided only the question of how death-qualification af-
fected a jury's sentencing determination. The Court explicitly left
open the question of whether death-qualified juries were conviction
prone.9
Recently the Court reexamined the Witherspoon standard in light
of what the Court saw as confusion surrounding the application of the
2. See Death Row, U.S.A, Report of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. 1 (Aug. 1, 1985).
3. Id. at 3.
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
5. See W. WHITE, LiFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL
CASES (1984).
6. Id at 97.
7. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
8. See W. WHrrE, supra note 5, at 97 (citation omitted).
9. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968).
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Witherspoon test in the lower courts. In Wainwright v. Witt,1o the
Court dramatically altered the Witherspoon test. The Court's ruling
effectively broadened the class of persons who may be excluded for
cause due to their personal hesitation to impose the death penalty. At
the same time, the Witt decision has lowered to an unacceptable level
the standard of proof required to show negative death penalty bias.
This Article examines the Witt decision and demonstrates why the
holding is at odds not only with death-qualification precedent but also
with nearly all the other death penalty decisions of the Court in the
past two decades. Following a presentation of the Witt decision in
Part II, Part III examines the Court's pre-Witt decisions to illustrate
the course of the death-qualification decisions since the landmark
Witherspoon holding, especially those cases relied upon by the Witt
majority to support the Court's change of heart on this issue. Part IV
of this Article scrutinizes the Witt decision in light of these cases and
demonstrates the incongruity and disquieting deviation from prece-
dent exemplified by the Court's holding in Witt. This analysis will
show that the Court has disregarded not only death-qualification pre-
cedent but, at the same time, has suddenly exhibited a disconcerting
insensitivity to adequate constitutional protection for capital defend-
ants. This insensitivity is clearly out of step with the Court's tradi-
tional attitude toward death penalty issues in general."' Part V of this
Article discusses briefly the ramifications of the Witt decision on the
issue of death-qualification and Witt's potential impact on the death
penalty in a broader sense. The Witt decision may have laid the
groundwork for an upcoming death-qualification case before the
Court this Term,1 2 and is probably an unfortunate sign of the current
Court's callousness toward defendants sentenced to death.
II. WAIN WRIGHT V. WITT
A. Facts
Johnny Paul Witt was convicted of first-degree murder in the State
of Florida and sentenced to death. The evidence shown at trial estab-
lished that Witt and a friend committed the murder of an eleven-year-
old boy while they were bow and arrow hunting. The two had appar-
ently spoken several times about killing a human and had been known
to "stalk" humans as they would an animal. On the day of the murder
the pair was hunting in a wooded area near a trail often used by chil-
dren. As the eleven-year-old victim rode by on his bicycle, Witt's ac-
complice hit the boy in the side of the head with a star drill bit. The
two gagged the stunned victim, placed him in their car's trunk, and
10. 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
11. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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drove to a deserted grove. When they removed the boy from the
trunk, they discovered that he had suffocated from the gag. The pair
then proceeded to commit various sexual and other violent acts on the
body, dug a grave, and buried the body.13
Witt was tried by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder. The
trial judge sentenced him to death upon the jury's recommendation.
Witt appealed to the Florida Supreme Court claiming that several pro-
spective jurors had been improperly excluded for cause through the
death-qualification procedure, in violation of the decision in Wither-
spoon. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence.14 After an unsuccessful attempt at post-conviction review in
the state courts, Witt filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court pursuant to section 2254 of the Habeas Corpus
Act. The federal district court denied the petition,15 but the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and granted the writ. The
court of appeals ruled that under the Witherspoon standard, one of
the prospective jurors had been improperly excluded for cause after
questioning by the prosecutor during voir dire.16 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the procedures for se-
lection of jurors in capital cases and to consider standards for federal
courts reviewing those procedures upon petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
B. Majority Opinion
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion expressed concern that trial
courts had been given the very difficult task, considering the state of
the law at the time of Witt, of distinguishing between jurors whose
opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to be impartial
or properly apply the law and those who, despite these feelings, could
be responsible, law-abiding jurors.' 7
The majority expressed displeasure not only with the lower courts'
application of the Witherspoon standard over the years, but with its
application in previous decisions of the Court.' 8 These decisions had
adhered to the Witherspoon requirement that a juror must make it
"unmistakably clear" that he or she "would 'automatically' vote
against the death penalty" before that juror could be excluded for
cause.19 Justice Rehnquist went on to cite two recent decisions of the
Court which demonstrated no ritualistic adherence to the above-
13. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1985).
14. Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
15. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1985).
16. 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1984).
17. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850-51 (1985).
18. Id. at 849.
19. Id (emphasis added).
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quoted language: Lockett v. Ohio,20 and Adams v. Texas.21
1. The Adams Test
The Witt majority held that the test for determining juror exclu-
sion articulated in Adams was preferable to the Witherspoon stan-
dard. The Adams standard states that if a person's views would
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,"22 that person
may be excluded from sitting on a jury. The Court cited several rea-
sons supporting its preference for the Adams test. First, the Wither-
spoon decision involved an Illinois statutory scheme that gave the jury
in a capital case unlimited discretion in imposing the death penalty.
The majority pointed out that sentencing juries no longer have such
discretion due to the Court's decisions in Furman v. Georgia,23 and
Gregg v. Georgia,24 and that many states, such as Texas, have adopted
a "guided discretion" sentencing scheme whereby jurors do not set the
death penalty; jurors merely answer questions of fact put to them by
the trial judge and, depending on the answers, the judge sets the pen-
alty. Therefore, the majority concludes, it no longer makes sense to
exclude only those jurors who will "automatically" vote against a
death penalty because they are not making the death-penalty decision.
Second, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Witherspoon stan-
dard was drawn from dicta in a footnote of that case. 25 The Court has
in the past found footnote language embodying dicta "not
controlling."2 6
Finally, the majority contended that Witherspoon's holding merely
limited a state's power to exclude jurors as another step toward the
goal of impanelling an impartial jury. Furthermore, the court con-
cluded, there is nothing unique about jury exclusion under Wither-
spoon as compared to any "traditional reasons for excluding jurors."
2 7
Thus a capital defendant is not entitled to any special legal presump-
tion or standard such as the strict standard set forth in Witherspoon.
The Court, for the above reasons, held that the simplified standard
in Adams is the proper standard for determining whether a juror with
scruples against the death penalty should be excluded for cause. In
addition, the majority dispensed with Witherspoon's requirement that
a juror's bias to "automatically" vote against the death penalty be
20. 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978). See infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
21. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
22. Id. at 45.
23. 408 U.S. 38 (1980).
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 851 (1985).
26. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141 (1981).
27. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 851 (1985).
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shown with "unmistakable clarity."28
2. Standards for Federal Courts Reviewing Death-Qualification
Procedures Under Section 2254 of the Habeas Corpus Act
The second issue before the Court in Witt was the standard to be
applied when, under a writ of habeas corpus, a federal court reviews a
trial court's rulings on exclusion of jurors under death-qualification
procedures.
Review of the Witt case arose after the defendant petitioned for
habeas corpus relief under section 2254 of the Habeas Corpus Act.29
Under section 2254(d) a federal court reviewing the case must accord
findings of state courts a "presumption of correctness" on all "factual
issues." 30
The Eleventh Circuit in Witt did not rule on whether the trial
court's finding was subject to a "presumption of correctness" because
it held that the case required reversal on other grounds.3 2 However,
the Eleventh Circuit held in a later case, Darden v. Wainwright,3 3
that Witherspoon inquiries were a "mixed question of law and fact"
and thus not subject to section 2254(d).
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that in Patton v. Yount,34 the
Court held that a trial judge's finding that three venire members were
not biased, and thus qualified to serve as jurors, was a "finding of fact
subject to section 2254(d)."35 The majority further stated that the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Darden was based on "the misapprehen-
sion that the standard for determining exclusion was ... Wither-
spoon's footnote 21-which imposed 'a strict legal standard' and 'a
very high standard of proof."' 36 The majority reemphasized its posi-
tion that excluding capital sentencing jurors "is no different from ex-
cluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias."37
Applying this reasoning and noting the Eleventh Circuit's error in
Darden, the majority then held that Patton must control.38 There-
fore, the Court decided that the question of proper exclusion of pro-
spective jurors in capital cases is a factual issue subject to section
2254(d). Consequently, federal review courts must apply a "presump-
28. Id at 852.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) (See Addendum for full text of § 2254).
30. Id at 2254(d).
31. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th
Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 1083 n.10.
33. 725 F.2d 1526, 1528-30 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2688 (1984).
34. 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984).
35. I at 2891.





tion of correctness" when scrutinizing a trial judge's death-qualifica-
tion rulings.
C. Dissent
It is no surprise that Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented
from the Witt decision. Brennan and Marshall have consistently ar-
gued that the imposition of a death sentence under any circumstances
contravenes the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment.
The dissenters stated that they would affirm the court of appeals'
decision in Witt regardless of their view of the death penalty. In gen-
eral, the dissent maintained that the majority completely missed the
point of the Witherspoon decision. Justice Brennan asserted that the
Witherspoon decision and subsequent holdings following the Wither-
spoon standard stood for the proposition that a death-qualification
procedure not meeting the strict standards of Witherspoon denies a
defendant "a neutral jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the com-
munity"39 and produces a jury from which an "identifiable segment of
the community has been excluded." 40 The resulting jury is "uncom-
monly willing to condemn a man to die."4 1 In essence, the dissent con-
tended that the majority opinion completely ignored the
constitutional safeguards set up in Witherspoon to protect defendants
facing the possibility of a death sentence.
Central to the dissent's criticism of the majority opinion is the as-
sertion that the Court had "brazenly" revised the Adams decision to
suit its purposes of deserting the Witherspoon standard.42 The dissent
noted that Justice Rehnquist was, ironically, the sole dissenter in Ad-
ams. Rehnquist's Adams dissent argued that Adams "expanded the
scope of Witherspoon's restrictions." 43 The Witt dissent, as well as
virtually all state and federal courts construing Adams, had inter-
preted Adams as consistent with Witherspoon.44 The dissent also
noted that Adams quoted Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one with
approval.
III. "DEATH-QUALIFICATION" PRIOR TO WITT-
WITHERSPOON AND ITS AFTERMATH
Jury selection is an important part of any criminal trial. Nowhere
is it more significant, however, than in a capital case where the de-
39. Id at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id at 860-61.
41. Id at 860.





fendant's life is at stake. Through the screening of jurors during voir
dire, both prosecutors and defense attorneys attempt to "stack the
deck" with jurors they feel will be more sympathetic to their cause.
Impartiality in a jury is the system's goal but a totally neutral jury is
virtually impossible. The prosecution and defense should be assured,
however, that jurors will at least consider the point of view advocated
by counsel at trial.
This reality of jury selection is what makes death-qualification in a
capital trial such a powerful tool in the prosecutor's hands. Prosecu-
tors can eliminate those persons who will not consider, or are less
likely to consider, returning a verdict of guilty or imposing a death
sentence due to personal scruples against capital punishment.
In Witherspoon the United States Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional an Illinois death statute that permitted the exclusion
for cause of any venireperson who has "conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or ... is opposed to the same."45 The Court
stated that "[iun its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death pen-
alty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man
to die."46 After holding that the Illinois selection process produced a
jury unfairly biased in favor of the death penalty, the Court articu-
lated a more equitable standard of death-qualification. That standard
attempted to strike a balance between the state's legitimate interest in
carrying out a constitutionally valid death penalty statute and the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial and impartial jury. The
standard set forth allowed the state to execute a defendant sentenced
to death by a jury as long as the only venirepersons who had been
stricken for cause were those:
who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that
might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their atti-
tude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt.47
For the next seventeen years, this language from the often-quoted
footnote twenty-one, along with footnote nine of Witherspoon,48 was
used by lower courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court, as
the guiding standard for "death-qualfication."49
45. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1968).
46. Id at 520-21.
47. Id at 522-23 & n.21 (emphasis in original).
48. Id. at 515 n.9. Footnote 9 relevant language states: "Unless a venireman states
unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed
that that is his position." Id at 516 n.9.
49. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262
(1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969); Hackathorn v. Decker, 438 F.2d




The Court in Witherspoon overturned the petitioner's death sen-
tence, not his conviction. 0 The petitioner had argued that Illinois'
death-qualification procedure produced a jury biased in favor of con-
viction as well as the imposition of the death penalty.51 The Court
held that "the data adduced by petitioner, ... are too tentative and
fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty
tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt."52 Wither-
spoon and its progeny have been cases that ruled on the composition of
death-qualified juries and their sentencing determinations, not on
their guilt/innocence decisions.
Witherspoon was emphatically reaffirmed by the Court in Boulden
v. Holman,5 3 and Maxwell v. Bishop.5 4 In Boulden the Court made it
clear that even though a person does not "believe in" capital punish-
ment or has a "fixed opinion against" it, that person "might neverthe-
less be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing law-to follow
conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge and to consider fairly
the imposition of the death sentence in a particular case."55
In Maxwell the Court reemphasized its position by holding that a
death sentence could not be carried out if it was imposed or recom-
mended by a jury from which venirepersons were excluded simply be-
cause they had expressed general objections to the death penalty. The
opinion once again asserted that unless a venireperson made it unmis-
takably clear that he or she would automatically vote against the im-
position of the death penalty, the lower court could not assume that
this person would not at least consider capital punishment if the facts
of the case warranted such a finding.
In a more recent opinion from the Court, Adams v. Texas,5 6 the
Witherspoon standard was once again applied to hold that a Texas
statutory oath taken by jurors contravened the sixth and fourteenth
amendments as construed in Witherspoon. Through the oath, jurors
pledged that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life
would not "affect [their] deliberations on any issue of fact."5 7 The Ad-
ams majority opinion, in a brazenly revised form, along with Justice
Rehnquist's sole dissenting opinion in Adams, are eventually merged
to become the majority opinion in Wainwright v. Witt. It is worth-
while, therefore, to devote special attention to the Court's opinion and
holding in Adams.
50. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518, 522 (1968).
51. Id. at 516-17.
52. Id at 517-18.
53. 394 U.S. 478 (1969).
54. 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
55. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969) (emphasis added).
56. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
57. I& at 40.
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The Court granted certiorari in the Adams case to answer two
questions. First, whether the Witherspoon doctrine was applicable to
the bifurcated procedure Texas employed in capital cases. Second, if
Witherspoon was applicable to such proceedings, whether in the case
at bar the exclusion of jurors pursuant to Texas Penal Code section
12.31(b) violated the Witherspoon doctrine.58
As to the first question, the Court held that Witherspoon did apply
to the bifurcated capital case proceedings used in Texas. The issue
arose because the Witherspoon case dealt with an Illinois statute that
gave the jury total discretion as to whether the death penalty was
proper in any given case. Texas, on the other hand, conducted capital
trials in a two-part proceeding. First, the jury decided the issue of
guilt. Second, the same jury responded to three questions of fact from
the judge relating to the defendant and the acts committed by the de-
fendant.5 9 If the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the an-
swers to these questions were "yes," then the judge was required to
impose the death sentence. Even if only one of these questions was
answered negatively, the judge must impose, by statute, a sentence of
life imprisonment.6 0 The Court conceded that the Texas jury played a
much more limited role in imposing the death sentence than did the
Witherspoon Illinois jury. However, even the State of Texas conceded
that a "guided discretion jury" will know, and are so informed, that
affirmative answers to the statutory questions will result in an auto-
matic imposition of the death sentence.61 A Texas juror's views on the
death penalty are thus equally as relevant whether the jury has total
or guided discretion in imposing the death sentence.
The Court went on to hold that Texas' use of section 12.31(b) in
Adams violated the Witherspoon standard because jurors were ex-
cluded "on a broader basis" than that allowed in Witherspoon.62 The
statute provided that a juror must be excluded unless she or he states
under oath that the mandatory death or life imprisonment sentence
will "not affect his or her deliberations on any issue of fact."63 Those
jurors in the Adams case that were unwilling or unable to take such
an oath were excluded by the trial judge. Texas disqualified not only
those persons who could be validly excluded under the Witherspoon
58. See infra note 63 for text of statute.
59. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 41 (1980).
60. Id
61. Id. at 47 n.4.
62. Id. at 48.
63. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(B) (Vernon 1974) provides as follows:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprison-
ment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospec-
tive juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states
under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life
will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
1986]
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doctrine, those unable to even consider the penalty of death or whose
views would not allow them to bring in a verdict of guilty, but also
those persons who honestly admitted the possibility that a death pen-
alty might affect how they looked at the evidence in relation to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority opinion stated:
Such a test could, and did, exclude jurors who stated that they would be 'af-
fected' by the possibility of the death penalty, but who apparently meant only
that the potentially lethal consequences of their decision would invest their
deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or would involve them
emotionally.
6 4
As the court pointed out, uneasiness, emotional involvement or the
inability to know for sure whether such a serious penalty will affect
one's view of the facts is not equivalent to a juror being unwilling or
unable to follow the court's instructions and obey his oath.65 Assess-
ments and honest judgments as to facts and what a juror believes to be
a reasonable doubt are inherent in the jury system. One would hope
that the thought of a defendant being put to death by the state would
in some way "affect" a juror's deliberations.
Adams held that jurors may be excluded if that person's beliefs
about capital punishment "would lead them to ignore the law or vio-
late their oaths."66 But the Court reversed the defendant's death sen-
tence in that case because Texas excluded jurors under section
12.31(b) "whose only fault was to take their responsibilities with spe-
cial seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or might
not be affected" by the thought of a person being put to death.
6 7
Of particular interest to this Article is Justice Rehnquist's sole dis-
senting opinion in Adams.68 Justice Rehnquist was of the opinion that
the majority had expanded the Witherspoon doctrine in Adams. The
dissent noted that a reexamination of the Witherspoon doctrine was
warranted by post-Witherspoon capital punishment decisions of the
Court. Justice Rehnquist contended that today's juries are no longer
vested with the total discretion that juries had at the time of Wither-
spoon. Specifically, the Texas statute at issue in Adams required a
judge to impose the death penalty if the jury answered these three
questions affirmatively:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
64. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1980).
65. I& at 50.
66. Id.
67. Id- at 50-51.





The dissent argued that "[i]t is hard to imagine a system of capital
sentencing that leaves less discretion in the hands of the jury. .. .
This difference in the role of the jury in Witherspoon and the Texas
jury in Adams requires a vastly different analysis according to the dis-
sent. Excluding jurors who cannot take the oath required of Texas
jurors should be constitutional, the dissent maintained, because their
role requires them to swear that they will answer the trial judge's
questions only on the basis of the evidence shown without regard to
the consequences of their answers.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Adams takes on special
significance in light of his majority opinion in Wainwright v. Witt.
The next section of this Article examines the disturbing irony of how
the Adams dissent was guilefully merged with the Adams majority
opinion (in an abbreviated form) to become the basis for Witt and the
end of the Witherspoon doctrine.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Witt Majority's Interpretation of the Adams Test
There is no doubt that the Court in Witt struggled with a perplex-
ing area of criminal law. Adjudicating substantive and procedural is-
sues surrounding the death penalty is an exacting task which results
in the onerous responsibility of deciding who lives and who dies. At
the same time, if a society ordains that human life is so precious that
the taking of a life merits the killer's own death, at the very least it is
incumbent upon that society to demand unyielding safeguards for de-
fendants and rigorous scrutiny of governmental decisions to execute
fellow human beings. Anything less is pure hypocrisy.
The United States Supreme Court has been intensely sensitive to
any issue bearing upon the punishment of death. Justice Stevens
made this posture clear when he stated "because of its severity and
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any
other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safe-
guards."71 In Witherspoon,72 the Court dove head-long into the death
penalty quagmire. Prior to Witherspoon the state's imposition of the
death penalty was largely unchecked by the Supreme Court. Wither-
spoon was the first case in which the Court struck down a state proce-
dure that was an integral part of the state's death penalty
administration. The Witherspoon decision marked the beginning of
69. Id at 53.
70. Id. at 54.
71. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
72. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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the Court's efforts to establish "unique safeguards" for capital
defendants.
This tradition continued with the Court's decisions in Furman v.
Georgia,73 in 1972 and Gregg v. Georgia,74 in 1976. The Furman deci-
sion rocked the nation when it overturned more than 600 death
sentences by invalidating four states' statutory death penalty schemes.
These states' statutes allowed a jury absolute discretion in imposing
either the death sentence or life imprisonment following conviction of
a capital offense. The Gregg decision refined Furman and settled the
four-year-long controversy over the constitutional legitimacy of capi-
tal punishment itself. Gregg held that the death penalty was not, in
and of itself, unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishment" pro-
hibited by the eighth amendment.75 Further, the Court held that a
jury-discretionary system was not invalid under Furman as long as it
was a scheme of "guided-discretion" set up by a state's legislature.
76
The Court in Furman and in Gregg expressed great concern over the
possibility of arbitrary and capricious imposition of a death sentence.
The Court's vigilance in establishing a just and rational system of capi-
tal punishment was continually illustrated in its post-Gregg decisions,
which resulted in still more procedural safeguards for capital
defendants. 77
The Court's post-Gregg decisions have shown a traditional commit-
ment to a stringent standard of due process, "super due process,"7 8 in
any case involving the death penalty. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the Court's death penalty decisions in 1983-84 illustrated
an abandonment of these due process requirements. 79 The Court's de-
cision in Wainwright v. Witt supports this suggestion and leaves little
doubt that the Court is slowly but surely dismantling the scrupulous
safeguards which have traditionally protected capital defendants.
Under the guise of a paternalistic search for clarity, the majority in
73. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
74. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75. The Gregg decision upheld the Georgia death penalty statute, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1982), which is the model for most current death penalty
statutes in other states.
76. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
77. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (prosecutor's comments to jury
leading it to believe that the responsibility for determining appropriateness of the
death penalty rested elsewhere held unconstitutional); California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992 (1983) (Court expresses concern over a state's death penalty procedural
process rather than its substantive law). See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodsen v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976).
78. Geimer, Death at any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat
from its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737, 738 (1985).
79. See, e.g., id.
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Witt essentially rewrote the Adams opinion in an effort to simplify
the death-qualification standard for trial courts. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, contended that the Witherspoon death-quali-
fication standard was outdated, in any event was only dicta, and was
far too difficult for trial courts to apply. The majority then proceeded
to emasculate the Witherspoon standard and held that the Court's
more recent decision in Adams was the proper standard. The dissent
in Witt aptly notes: "Adams did not ... desert the principles of
Witherspoon. It is the Court's brazenly revisionist reading of Adams
today that leaves Witherspoon behind."80
Although the Witt majority stated that a new "Adams test" merely
simplified the Witherspoon standard, in reality the two tests differ
vastly in language and substance.81 The Adams test states that a juror
may be excluded for cause if his views regarding the death penalty
would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."8 2 The Ad-
ams test no longer requires, according to the Court's holding, that a
juror would "automatically" vote against the death penalty to be ex-
cluded nor that that bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity."8 3
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion offered three justifications
for preferring what the opinion termed the "Adams test." The first
reason is tied to changes in the role of sentencing juries in capital cases
since the Witherspoon decision. The 'Court's second justification
stems from the contention that Witherspoon's footnote twenty-one
was merely dicta with no precedential weight. The final, and possibly
most disturbing justification is the majority's view that the Adams test
for exclusion of jurors is in accord with traditional reasons for exclud-
ing jurors for any other bias, in any other kind of case, capital or non-
capital.
The majority's main justification for preferring the new "Adams
test"-the changes in the role of sentencing juries since Wither-
spoon-is analytically troublesome for several reasons. Justice Rehn-
quist stated in Witt that "[i]n Witherspoon the jury was vested with
unlimited discretion in choice of sentence." However, "[a]fter our de-
cisions in Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia sentencing juries
[can] no longer be invested with such discretion."8 4 At least one com-
mentator has suggested that this assertion by the Court is inaccu-
rate.8 5 "Capital sentencing discretion, the Court has said, may remain
80. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 866 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
82. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985).
83. I&
84. Id- at 851 (citations omitted).
85. Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the Selection Stage of
Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 1037, 1075 (1985).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
'unbridled.' "86 The article points out that Texas, where Adams hailed
from, is the only state where juries do lack such discretion.8 7 The ma-
jority in Witt has now promulgated a new death-qualification stan-
dard for all states which authorizes a death penalty based on a unique
sentencing scheme from Texas. "[J]ustice Rehnquist ignored the
jury's role in Florida, the State that had condemned Witt to death, and
sought his proof elsewhere."8 8
The Witt majority, on the other hand, contends that today's capital
sentencing juries play sufficiently different roles to warrant the new
"Adams test." In essence, the majority opinion tells us that today's
sentencing juries do not have the same degree of power over the de-
fendant's life, and since the guided discretion system, as that suggested
in Gregg v. Georgia,8 9 adequately protects the defendant, the states no
longer must seat jurors who, though otherwise qualified, might be
hesitant to impose the death penalty. The only concern the state has
today is seating jurors who will follow their oaths and the judge's in-
structions and not let a minor detail like an execution cloud their
minds. The logic of the majority's opinion at this point is untenable.
As the dissent in Witt points out, Justice Rehnquist used this same
argument to dissent from the Adams opinion. Now he uses the argu-
ment to justify "a 'test' purportedly derived from the Court's holding
in [Adams]."90
Precedent and logic point to a result contrary to that reached by
Justice Rehnquist in Witt. Capital sentencing juries are well aware of
the consequences of their decisions, whether it be a total discretion
system, guided discretion system, or the unique factfinding role of the
Texas jury. Justice Rehnquist's attitude of "don't blame it on the jury
if the defendant gets the death sentence" is exactly the type of argu-
ment that the Court ruled unconstitutional in a case decided five
86. Id. at 1075, 1051 n.99, referring to California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), in
which Justice O'Connor stated:
[Tihe constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sen-
tencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing "scheme
that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the
defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by
statute."
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 n.22 (1983) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 875 (1982)).
87. Gillers, supra note 85, at 1075.
88. Id. at 1076. See also Winick, Witherspoon in FMorida: Reflections on the Chal-
lenge for Cause of Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in Which the Judge Makes
the Sentencing Decision, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 825 (1983), for a complete discus-
sion of Florida juries advisory role in sentencing. The author further suggests
that there should be no death-qualification of capital juries in states where judges
do the sentencing.
89. See supra note 75.
90. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 868 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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months after Witt. In CaldweZ v. Mississippi,91 the Court vacated the
death sentence of the petitioner due to the prosecutor's closing re-
marks to a sentencing jury urging them not to view themselves as fi-
nally determining whether the defendant would die, because the
Mississippi Supreme Court would review their sentence for correct-
ness. The prosecutor was allowed by the trial judge to make it clear to
the jury that they were merely following the law laid down by the
Mississippi legislature, not arbitrarily imposing a death sentence.92
The Court in Caldwell held that a death sentence, imposed by a
jury who was led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere, could not
stand.9 3 It was held that such a death sentence violated the eighth
amendment's" 'need for reliability in determinations that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."'
94
The majority argument in Witt cuts directly against the grain of
Caldwell as well as the Court's other eighth amendment decisions in
capital cases which require that capital sentencing juries treat their
power to determine the appropriateness of death as an "awesome re-
sponsibility."95 Because the eighth amendment demands such "relia-
bility" and requires jurors to recognize their "awesome responsibility"
when handing down a sentence of death, it is incumbent upon states to
seat jurors who will meticulously scrutinize all the evidence before
them. Empirical evidence accumulated since Witherspoon has shown
that death-qualified juries are less likely to produce such results.
9 6
Death-qualified juries tend to be homogeneous in attitude and life ex-
perience, tend to produce less discussion and debate in deliberation
and require less evidence to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
9 7
Given this evidence and the new Adams test which allows even
broader exclusion on the basis of death penalty attitudes, the Witt de-
cision has produced a situation in which capital defendants are almost
assured of a sentencing jury that will be biased in favor of imposing
the death sentence.
Justice Rehnquist, in an effort to assure that states are not re-
91. 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
92. Id. at 2638.
93. Id. at 2637-38.
94. Id. at 2636-37 (quoting Woodsen v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion) (emphasis added)).
95. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (1985). See also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodsen v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
96. See generally Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification
on Jurors'Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW &
Hum. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Finch & Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-Qual-
ified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REv. 21 (1985).
97. See authorities cited supra note 96.
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quired to seat jurors biased in favor of capital defendants, has swung
the pendulum to the opposite extreme. The majority eliminated the
requirement that a juror make it "unmistakably clear" that he or she
would never vote for the death penalty. The Witt ruling allows states
to exclude jurors who are merely unsure or admit some hesitation
about the death penalty or its effects on their deliberations. The ma-
jority is now asking the impossible of a juror. How could a juror make
such a determination before hearing one shred of evidence or fact
against the accused? In fact, the Witt case is a perfect example of this
dilemma. Even the most adamant opponent of the death penalty
would cringe after hearing the gruesome details of the murder and
molestation of an eleven-year-old boy.98 It is likely that any hesita-
tions about imposing the death sentence on the defendant in Witt
might quickly disappear if a juror were convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that Witt had committed the acts described in the facts.
In addition, as the dissent in Witt points out, if a juror expresses
uncertainty as to whether her death penalty attitude will color her
judgment as to facts in a case, it should be up to the state to prove that
such bias will rise to a level of not allowing a juror to follow her oath
or follow a trial judge's instructions. A trial judge should not be al-
lowed to assume that a potential juror who has qualms about the
death penalty is automatically an untrustworthy person who cannot
be depended on to follow the law. Just as the "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt standard of guilt allocates to the State any cost of uncer-
tainty" as to a defendant's guilt,99 so should the cost of uncertainty as
to a prospective juror's bias be allocated to the State..00
The Witt majority's second justification for preferring the Adams
test was that the Witherspoon standard was developed from dicta in a
footnote.101 It is perplexing, if indeed the standard in the footnote was
merely useless dicta, that the Court itself and a score of federal and
state courts had adopted the standard over some seventeen years.102
Indeed, even the Adams opinion, on which Justice Rehnquist bases his
disapproval of the Witherspoon standard, quotes Witherspoon's foot-
note twenty-one with approval.03 The Court's second justification
thus appears to be only a weak excuse to relieve the Court of the bur-
den of explaining away the seventeen years of precedent upholding
the Witherspoon standard.
The Court's third justification for its opinion is based on an alarm-
98. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
99. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 862 (1985) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
370-73 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
100. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 862 (1985).
101. Id. at 851.
102. Id at 868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980).
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ing premise. The Witt decision offers the view that exclusion of jurors
"because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from
excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in
bias."1 0 4 This argument is diametrically opposed not only to the con-
stitutional standards of Witherspoon but also to the Court's tradi-
tional "super due process" analysis of all issues which relate to the
death penalty.105 Justice Rehnquist's statement that "there is nothing
talismanic about juror exclusion under Witherspoon merely because it
involved capital sentencing juries" 06 not only ignores precedent but
also demonstrates an egregious insensitivity to human life.
The majority opinion assumes on the one hand that persons with
reservations about imposing the death penalty cannot "conscientiously
apply the law and find the facts"107 then goes even further to assume
that death-qualified juries will be impartial and adequately protect the
defendant's rights while also upholding the state's interests. The ma-
jority completely ignored the Witherspoon finding that a state that
excludes all those opposed to capital punishment produces a jury that
falls "woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was
entitled"108 and produces a jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a
man to die."109 This language was quoted in Adams as well in refer-
ence to the effects of the Texas death-qualification procedure.110 In
addition, nearly every study on death-qualification since Witherspoon
has pointed to the conclusion that these juries are more likely to con-
vict a defendant, and having convicted, more likely to sentence the
defendant to death.111 With the new Adams test this effect will cer-
tainly be intensified since a much broader class of people may now be
excluded for cause.
As the Witt dissent points out, the majority opinion all but ignores
the sixth amendment analysis that is crucial to the Witherspoon hold-
ing and the entire death-qualification issue.112 Justice Rehnquist is
only concerned with the impartiality of individual jurors and evades
the sixth amendment's core concern, an impartial jury that is repre-
sentative of a fair cross-section of the community." 3 A jury's role in
104. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 855 (1985).
105. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
106. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985) (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968).
109. Id at 521 (emphasis added).
110. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 43-44 (1980).
111. See authorities cited supra note 96. For opinions which contain exhaustive lists
confirming that death-qualified juries are conviction prone, see Wainwright v.
Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 871 n.11 (1985); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 233-34 (8th
Cir. 1985); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 27-42, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-26, 168
Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-53 (1980).
112. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 869 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975).
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capital cases can never be underestimated. "One of the most impor-
tant functions any jury can perform in making such a selection of life
or death is to maintain a link between contemporary community val-
ues and the penal system .. ,"114 Justice Stevens recently reiterated
this view: "[I]f the decision that capital punishment is the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is justified because it expresses the commu-
nity's moral sensibility ... it follows ... that a representative cross-
section of the community must be given the responsibility for making
that decision."115 Broad death-qualification such as that envisioned by
the majority in Witt threatens this fair cross section requirement of
the sixth amendment and, in addition, drastically reduces the reliabil-
ity factor of death penalty decisions demanded by the eighth
amendment.
Justice Rehnquist's insensitive majority opinion not only jeopar-
dizes the constitutional rights of capital defendants, it is also a per-
sonal affront to that segment of our country that views capital
punishment as at least a questionable practice for a civilized govern-
ment. The tone of Justice Rehnquist's opinion reflects the attitude of
the Illinois trial judge in the Witherspoon case. Early in the voir dire
the trial judge remarked, "'Let's get these conscientious objectors out
of the way, without wasting any time on them.' "116 The Witt decision
has returned us to the situation which existed before Witherspoon
when persons were excludable for honestly conceding that the pros-
pect of the death penalty could, in some way, affect their judgment of
the facts or what they deem to be a reasonable doubt.
The death-qualification process is a complicated practice with com-
plex psychological results that tend to favor only prosecutors in capi-
tal cases. The phrase "death-qualified jury" mirrors in and of itself
the attitude expressed by Justice Rehnquist and the Witherspoon trial
judge. The phrase connotes an inability on the part of prospective ju-
rors to meet a state's standard to decide questions of life and death.
Such jurors are told that they do not "qualify" to sit on a jury and be a
part of decisions of great magnitude. This process, which takes place
before any evidence is produced against a defendant, puts the death
sentence foremost in the minds of future jurors and, as fellow jurors
are stricken for being too faint-hearted regarding the death penalty,
leads a jury to believe that criminal justice authority figures want only
jurors who are "hard-nosed" about imposing the death sentence. 1 7
Given the complex nature of this issue and the gravity of its impor-
114. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
115. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (emphasis added).
116. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968) (no citation to the record
provided).
117. Haney, Examining Death Qualification-Further Analysis of the Process Effect,
8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 145 (1984).
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tance, the Court was obligated to be forthright in its analysis of prece-
dent and more adequately assess the ultimate effects of its holding on
the rights of capital defendants.
It defies reason that Justice Rehnquist would base his disapproval
of the Witherspoon standard on two of the Court's decisions which
upheld that standard and cited its language with approval. The
Court's opinion in Lockett v. Ohio,118 Justice Rehnquist notes, did not
refer to Witherspoon's "automatically" language but only the "unmis-
takably clear" language. 119 The Adams opinion used somewhat differ-
ent language to describe the limitation on the state's power to exclude
scrupled jurors. The majority in Adams stated that the Witherspoon
line of cases "establishe[d] the general proposition" that a juror could
not be excluded "unless those views [about capital punishment] would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a ju-
ror in accordance with his instructions and oath."12 0 Justice Rehn-
quist thus determined that Adams had complicated the death-
qualification arena. This is a perplexing conclusion given the fact that
virtually all federal and state appellate courts had determined that
Adams clearly endorsed the Witherspoon standard drawn from foot-
note twenty-one.' 2 ' Neither Lockett nor Adams advocated or even
hinted at eliminating any aspect of the Witherspoon test. The Witt
decision is clearly not supported by the Court's own precedent.
B. Standard of Review of State Court Death-Qualification
Determinations
The second question before the Court in Witt related to the degree
of deference that a federal court should pay to a state trial judge's
determination of juror bias under Witherspoon. Witt petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus under section 2254 of the Habeas Corpus Act.122
Pursuant to section 2254(d)123 any federal reviewing court must ac-
cord any findings of state courts on "factual issues" a presumption of
correctness.124
In order to answer the question of what degree of deference should
be accorded a trial judge's determination of bias pursuant to Wither-
spoon challenges under section 2254(d), the Court was required to de-
cide whether Witherspoon determinations were "questions of fact" or
118. 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978).
119. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 850 (1985).
120. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
121. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 866 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent cites numerous lower court opinions that interpret Adams as a clear en-
dorsement of Witherspoon.
122. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
123. See Addendum for full text of § 2254.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
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"mixed determinations of law and fact."1 25 If the Court held that
Witherspoon findings fell into the latter category, the section 2254(d)
"presumption of correctness" standard would not apply.126
It is at this point that Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Witt
reveals its true colors. The majority opinion admits that under the
Witherspoon test, with its "strict legal standard" and "very high bur-
den of proof," a trial judge's determination of bias would appear to be
a "mixed question of law and fact," thus not subject to section
2254(d)'s "presumption of correctness." 27 However, since Justice
Rehnquist eliminated the Witherspoon test and its strict legal stan-
dard by rewriting the Adams majority opinion, the new Adams test
conveniently allows the Court to hold that future bias determinations
on the issue of scruples against the death penalty are "questions of
fact."
Justice Rehnquist reaches his conclusion based on the Court's
holding in the case of Patton v. Yount.128 In Patton the respondent
had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. Similarly, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus under section 2254, challenging the trial judge's determination
that the jury was impartial. The Court held that the trial judge's de-
termination that three jurors were not biased due to media publicity
surrounding the murder was a "question of fact" subject to a "pre-
sumption of correctness" under section 2254(d).129 The two reasons
given by the Court to support this finding were, (1) that the trial judge
reaches a determination as to juror excludability after extended voir
dire, and (2) that the trial judge's decision to exclude a juror is often
made in part on the judge's determination of the credibility and de-
meanor of the prospective juror, a determination not susceptible to
duplication or review at the appellate level.130
The Witt majority then determined that "Patton's holding applies
equally well to a trial court's determination that a prospective capital
sentencing juror was properly excluded for cause."131 The Court
reached this conclusion for two reasons. First, the Court eliminated
the Witherspoon "strict legal standard and very high standard of
proof" found in footnote twenty-one of the Witherspoon opinion.13 2
The Court's redefinition of Witherspoon's legal standard was essen-
tially an elimination of any substantial legal standard. Second, with-
out such a strict legal standard, the trial judge's determinations of
125. Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526, 1528-30 (11th Cir. 1984).
126. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980).
127. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 855 (1985).
128. 104 S. Ct. 2885 (1984).
129. IH at 2891.
130. Id. at 2892.
131. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854 (1985).
132. IM at 855.
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juror exclusion due to bias are now "factual issues" just as they were
in Patton.133 The Court then concluded that "once it is recognized
that excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors because of their
opposition to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors
for innumerable other reasons which result in bias, Patton must
control."1
34
The Court's conclusion that exclusions for cause due to bias are
indistinguishable follows perfectly with the Court's reasoning earlier
on in the Witt opinion. The Court stated that "the Adams standard is
proper because it is in accord with traditional reasons for excluding
jurors .... "135 Exclusions for cause due to a potential juror's bias
facilitates the "quest for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law
and find the facts."1
3 6
The Court's concern about seating a biased juror is well founded
with respect to Patton and the capital sentencing jury at issue in Texas
in the Adams opinion. Both of these juries were acting as fact-finders.
"A state is authorized to excuse a fact-finder for 'bias' if she is inclined
to distort the factfinding process in favor of a particular result."137 Es-
sentially, the Court has shown that today's sentencing juries are much
like the guilt determining juries in that they must be able to "consci-
entiously apply the law and find the facts." 3 8 Therefore, the Court
was correct in holding that the standard for exclusion in Patton ap-
plies equally to a capital sentencing jury in Texas.
Texas, however, is not Florida. The Witt opinion involved a capital
sentencing jury operating under Florida law. The Florida jury does
not sentence' 39 but instead "recommends sentence to which state law
requires some judicial deference."14 0 Further, "nearly every other
state in which juries sentence have as much discretion as the Illinois
jury had in Witherspoon."'41
As one commentator points out, "Witt's use of the words 'bias' and
'impartial' in connection with both factfinding and sentencing, in an
apparent effort to facilitate 'merge[r]' of the two, is ... miscon-
ceived."142 It is simply illogical to demand that discretionary capital
sentencers be free from bias. Since the Furman and Gregg decisions,
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id- at 851.
136. Id. at 852.
137. Gillers, supra note 85, at 1077.
138. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985).
139. See Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984). See also Winick, supra note 88,
who argues that death-qualification should not apply in states where judges sen-
tence capital defendants.
140. Gillers, supra note 85, at 1070.
141. Id. at 1075.
142. Id at 1077.
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the Court has emphasized twin objectives in its pursuit of constitution-
ally valid death penalty schemes. First, the procedure must be able to
"rationally distinguish between those for whom death is an appropri-
ate sanction and those for whom it is not."143 Second, "it must allow
the sentencer to consider the individual circumstances of the defend-
ant, his background, and his crime."144 These objectives are in part
met by allowing the jury to be "the voice of the community."145 The
Court has often noted that "a jury that must choose between life im-
prisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do
nothing less- than express the conscience of the community. ... 146
The voice or conscience of the community is necessarily expressed
through its bias, the basis for its opinions and moral standards. It
makes little sense for the Court to require capital sentencer discre-
tion,147 then in turn demand, as in Witt, that a sentencing jury be un-
biased and impartial. The discretionary capital sentencer is not
finding fact. "There is no objective right answer. The discretionary
sentencing decision-life or death-is entirely subjective."148
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt has granted trial
judges nearly unfettered discretion in determinations of juror bias,
based on a juror's feelings regarding the imposition of the death pen-
alty. Literally any juror with the slightest hesitation about imposing
the death penalty may validly be stricken for cause on the ground that
the trial judge's intuition or hunch tells him or her that this juror
might be unable to impartially find the facts and apply them to the
law. Further, on appellate review, these determinations will be "pre-
sumed correct" even "where the record does not indicate the standard
applied by a state trial judge."149
In a country which has established that a jury must find that the
accused is guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," such a standard as that
established in Witt should be intolerable. A trial judge under the
Witt standard may find as a "question of fact" that a juror is biased
based on that judge's mere hunch.
Numerous questions have been raised by the Witt opinion. Two
justifications lay at the core of the Witt holding, the changed role of
juries which now have limited sentencing discretion and the view that
143. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3162-63 (1984).
144. Id. at 3163.
145. Id
146. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); see also notes 114-15 and accom-
panying text.
147. Gillers, supra note 85, at 1076.
148. I& at 1078.
149. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 856 (1985).
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the capital versus non-capital distinction is no longer important.
Given these contentions, one must ask why we continue to allow
death-qualification at all? The majority of federal and state courts
have held that the mere mention of possible punishment prior to guilt
determinations distorts the jury's decision-making process, influences
the juror's role as fact finder, and constitutes reversible error.150 Em-
pirical evidence suggests that discussion of penalty prior to any deter-
mination of guilt undermines the fairness and impartiality of capital
juries.15' Additionally, this question may be especially important in
states that do not have juries sentencing the defendant. Some com-
mentators have suggested that death-qualification is particularly inap-
propriate and unconstitutional in states where judges make
sentencing decisions.152
It should be noted that the death-qualification issue will once again
be before the Court this term.153 The Witherspoon line of cases, pre-
sumably including Witt, only dealt with death-qualification in terms
of sentencing juries. The Witherspoon case left open the question of
whether the use of death-qualified juries to decide guilt offended the
sixth amendment.154 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grigsby
v. Mabry,155 recently held that death-qualified juries are indeed viola-
tive of the sixth amendment and "conviction prone." The Court re-
cently granted certiorari to decide this issue.15
6
The Witt holding, as well as the tone of the opinion, may have set
the stage for the Grigsby appeal. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Adams
and his majority opinion in Witt contains language that enables one to
predict easily the outcome of the Court's upcoming ruling in Lockhart
v. McCree (the Grigsby appeal). In Adams, Justice Rehnquist stated,
"I can see no plausible distinction between the role of the jury in the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial and its role... in the sentencing
phase." 5 7 In Witt the majority stated that "[t]he tests with respect to
sentencing and guilt, originally in two prongs, have been merged
... ,"158 The Court in Witt effectively blurred the distinction be-
tween factfinding and sentencing.159 This language suggests the Court
150. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975); Chapman v. United States,
443 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1971); State v. Tirs, 143 Ariz. 196, 693 P.2d 333 (1985);
State v. Harris, 258 La. 720,247 So. 2d 847 (1971); State v. Stub, 48 Ohio App. 2d 57,
355 N.E.2d 819 (1975); Toone v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 8, 161 S.W.2d 90 (1942).
151. See Haney, supra note 117.
152. See Winick, supra note 88.
153. See infra note 156.
154. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968).
155. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
156. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.), cert granted sub nom Lockhart v. Mc-
Cree, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985).
157. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 54 (1980).
158. Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 851 (1985).
159. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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may decide that the state's interest in implementing its capital sen-
tencing scheme and in seating an impartial jury will justify the ex-
cusal of capital jurors with any hesitancy about the death penalty at
the guilt determination phase as well as the sentencing phase. If the
Court believes that hesitant capital jurors are not qualified to decide a
defendant's sentence, the Court is not likely to trust such a juror as to
the question of guilt either.
Teresa A. Brown, '87
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ADDENDUM
Section 2254(d) of the Habeas Corpus Act provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by
a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant
for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evi-
denced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate
written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall es-
tablish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State
court hearing;,
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State
court hearing;,
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over
the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;,
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;,
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in
the State court proceeding;, or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State
court proceeding;,
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to determination
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is
produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration
of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determina-
tion is not fairly supported by the record: And in an evidentiary hearing in
the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determi-
nation has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circum-
stances respectively set forth in the paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive,
is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respon-
dent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a
whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall
rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual
determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982).
